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ABSTRACT
CAROLINE MÜRER ROHDE-MOE: The Eurozone: Effects on Spain After the
Implementation of the Euro
(Under the direction of Joshua Hendrickson)
This thesis examines the current situation in the Eurozone and how the entry
into the currency union has affected the member countries. I have especially focused
on the consequences the implementation of the euro has had on Spain because of the
deeper recession that this country has experienced compared to many of the other
Eurozone countries. I wanted to figure out what has caused some nations to struggle
at a different level than others. By comparing Spain to countries such as Germany,
United Kingdom, and France I have tried to look into how much of the domestic
problems seen in the Eurozone are the result of the common monetary
policy and how much is due to country-specific issues.
The paper briefly describes currency unions where the relatively short-lived
Eurozone currency union is compared to the American currency union using the
dollar. Furthermore, the Eurozone financial crisis of 2008 is discussed and how the
period right after the crisis has been crucial for the countries that today are finding
themselves encountering economic difficulties. The data that has been gathered for
this paper comes from examining previous journals and researching various Internet
sources.
The findings illustrate that the problems that many of the nations in the
Eurozone have encountered are a mix of the imposed monetary policy that the
countries were obligated to follow when entering the currency union, and country-

	
  

iii

specific issues. To explore these indicators further, statistical data such as the
unemployment rate, debt to GDP ratio, and inflation rates were examined. Spain’s
unemployment rate is currently extremely high, and I found that it has diverged from
many of the other countries in the Eurozone since the financial crisis of 2008. This
problem has risen from for example the country’s employment protection legislation,
strong protection of permanent workers, and high share of temporary workers. My
findings for Spain illustrate that the problem has been a mix between the common
Eurozone monetary policy and Spain’s employment protection legislation policy.
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Introduction
A unique attempt of European economic integration was done in 1999 with the
introduction of the common currency for the Eurozone countries. I am researching
how the different member nations have reacted to this membership. In my work, I
especially focus on the consequences this change has had on the Spanish economy,
which has been struggling for various reasons since the implementation of the euro. In
this research I will try to answer whether it could be that this deeper recession Spain
has experienced is due to structural problems unique to Spain, or if it is due to the
membership of Spain in the European Union, which would indicate a suboptimal
policy. By looking at Spain in particular, I try to determine the extent to which the
problems European countries have experienced are the result of a common monetary
policy and how much is the result of country-specific characteristics. In the paper I
have done a detailed analysis of the Spanish labor market and compared it to other
member nations in the Eurozone to see if it was a good or bad decision for Spain to
join the common currency union.
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Chapter 1
Currency Unions
A. What are Currency Unions?
A currency union consists of a group of countries with the same currency that
also shares a common monetary policy. Currency unions are often used as a way to
achieve international economic integration. It is common for countries within a
currency union to share geographical borders, and hence the member nations are often
close trading partners. A currency union also has a common central bank. There has
been a lot of research looking at the advantages and disadvantages of currency unions.
Different research has found benefits and costs of membership in a currency union.
For example, Hugh Rockoff (2000) found in his research that one benefit of a
currency union is that it makes it easy to travel to another part of the union without
having to convert money. This aspect makes it especially easy for tourists and
producers to travel and do business amongst the different member countries without
complications of various currencies. Also, one can easily compare prices for goods
and services, and interregional investments can be made without the risk of currency
fluctuations. Another advantage of being a member of a currency union is that
transaction costs get reduced due to the fact that the people travelling within the
currency union do not have to exchange currency and hence avoid paying commission
to financial intermediaries. A common currency between a group of countries also
creates a degree of certainty for firms because it is easier for them to predict the cost
of materials they use in production that are imported from other countries. This aspect
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makes it easier for firms to plan for the future because they can find a good estimate
of how much their exports will cost, hence, allowing them to be more certain about
predictions for future budgets. This tendency will make firms more likely to invest
and create more jobs.
However, researchers have also argued that there are many costs of joining a
monetary union. The biggest disadvantage is that a country that enters a monetary
union loses their sovereignty over monetary policy and is not able to control their
economy in the same way they would have been able to do if they were independent.
Another problem that countries have encountered when establishing a currency union
is that convergence between economies can be difficult due to the uniqueness of every
country’s economy. When there are big differences between the countries it can be
seen as unproductive to have the same monetary policy because policies that will
benefit one country might be disastrous for another. These differences are an aspect
that I will examine about the Eurozone and how it has affected the different member
countries, especially Spain. The countries that joined the currency union in Europe
had vastly different economies before the entry and to share a common monetary
policy has led to difficulties for certain member countries. This issue is because of the
possibility that monetary policy for the Eurozone as a whole is different from the
desired policy of one particular member country. One reason for this disadvantage is
that member countries might be subject to asymmetric shocks. A currency union is
subject to an asymmetric shock if the demand or supply side of one or more of the
member countries is affected differently than any of the other member countries when
a shock in the economy occurs. For example, if the German government decides to
make changes to the country’s fiscal policy by increasing government expenditures, it
will result in a positive aggregate demand shock for Germany. However, if the
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government in France, at the same time, decides to adjust their fiscal policy by doing
the opposite and lower expenditures in the country, then France will experience a
negative aggregate demand shock. If this were the case, then these two different
countries would be better off with separate currencies, and floating or at least
adjustable rates between them (Rockoff, 2000). When a currency union is
experiencing asymmetric shocks between their member countries it is challenging for
the central bank of the monetary union to conduct a monetary policy that is beneficial
for each member of the union. The country that is most affected by an asymmetric
shock would benefit from having a lower interest rate compared to the other
countries. Therefore, there are obvious costs associated with joining a currency union.
Nonetheless, there are examples of countries and regions that have benefitted from
entering into currency unions, the most obvious of which is the United States.
One of the most famous and recent examples of a currency union is the attempt of
unifying the currencies of the many nations in Europe. The Eurozone was formed
January 1st, 1999 when eleven countries in Europe adopted the common currency.
The introduction of the euro in 1999 was a major step towards a closer European
integration. The countries that joined the Eurozone gave up their national currencies
to use the euro as their medium of exchange. By January 21st, 2002 all the national
currencies of the member nations ceased to circulate and were replaced by the euro.
The Eurozone currency union is in many ways an unparalleled experiment in
monetary unification and a milestone in European integration. Today, the Eurozone,
which currently consists of 18 countries, has been going for 15 years and more than
333 million EU citizens use the euro as their currency.
Since the introduction of the euro some things have changed in the Eurozone.
For example, Francesco Paolo Mongelli (2002) argues that countries sharing the same
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currency trade three times as much as they would with different currencies and being
a member of a currency union more than triples trade among partner countries.
Therefore Eurozone countries are becoming more specialized by focusing on the
activities in which they are comparatively stronger. A relevant question is which
direction causation runs and whether countries are in a currency union because they
rely on trading with other countries, or start trading more because they form a
currency union. There is now also more emphasis on the benefits for a larger group of
countries scoring highly under most Optimal Currency Area properties. In his work,
Mogelli (2002) argues that 10-15 years ago it was not believed that the Eurozone
would have as many member as it does today. The euro has already developed into a
major currency and in some ways it is challenging the U.S. dollar as the global
reserve currency. In their research, Lars Jonung and Eoin Drea argue that the euro is
one of the most exciting experiments in monetary history due to the fact that never
before have some of the world’s largest economies surrendered their national
currencies and national monetary sovereignty in favor of a common currency and a
common central bank (Jonung and Drea, 2010).

B. The Theory of Optimal Currency Areas
As previously mentioned, the most significant characteristic of currency
unions is that the member nations have surrendered their own currency and now share
a common currency. The Theory of Optimal Currency Areas centers on the issue of
whether or not a geographic region should share a currency in order to maximize
economic efficiency, and grew out of the debate over fixed versus flexible exchange
rates. Mongelli (2002) defines an optimal currency area as “the optimal geographic
domain of a single currency, or of several currencies, whose exchange rates are
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irrevocably pegged and might be unified.” Therefore, an optimal currency area is a
geographical region in which it would maximize economic efficiency to have the
entire region share a common currency. Mongelli (2002) also argues that the
European experience with economic and monetary union is the most important
example of recently established currency unions and the one to which the Theory of
Optimal Currency Areas has been most frequently applied. This signals how much the
Eurozone countries can benefit from their currency union if they manage to lead it in
the right direction. The monetary union in the Eurozone is interesting because
individual countries of Europe do not each form an optimal currency area, but
together as a whole Europe is an example of a prospect that can be a successful
monetary union.
To become a strong currency union like the U.S. is a long and difficult
process. Throughout history, it is evident that to become a successful currency union
there are central phases that an area has to go through. In his research, Mongelli
(2002) recognizes four phases of the optimum currency area: pioneering phase,
reconciliation phase, reassessment phase, and empirical phase. Rockoff (2000)
argues that optimal currency area theorists have found several factors that identify an
area as a candidate for its own currency, including that it must be a large area that is
specialized in the production of certain goods. If the member nations of the currency
union have similar economies with related production then it will be easier for the
central bank to conduct a monetary policy that will be beneficial for all countries.
This aspect will protect the currency union from large asymmetric shocks, which
economies are subject to over the course of the business cycle. Other factors that are
important in order for countries to be suitable to enter into a currency union together
are labor mobility and capital mobility. High labor mobility is important because it
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enables workers to work in other countries within the currency union and can
therefore result in more skilled workers for the correct jobs, hence an increase in
productivity. However, labor mobility can also result in a higher unemployment rate
and lower wages so it is important for the currency union to consist of economies
where labor mobility can be exploited. Capital mobility is significant for a currency
union because it is important for the member countries to be able to easily transfer
capital across boarders without incurring high transaction costs in the process. Also,
fiscal transfers between the candidate region and other regions should be limited
because this will keep as much capital as possible running through the currency union
and therefore become a stronger area (Rockoff, 2000).
In his research, Marjan Petreski (2007) lists other factors that are detrimental
elements to whether an area is optimal for a currency union or not. He argues that
when a shock in the economy occurs, it is important for the currency union to have
price and wage flexibility that will allow the corrective adjustments that have to be
made help all of the member countries. With this flexibility, the currency union will
avoid creating a high unemployment rate in one country and inflation in the other. In
the same paper, Petreski (2007) also argues that when inflation rates of the countries
in a currency union converge, the terms of trade will do the same. Another important
aspect of a currency union that Petreski (2007) discuss is that it should be a unified
financial market, which will prevent the need for an exchange rate adjustment. He
expands on this issue with relating it to the significance of economic openness. The
argument is that the higher the openness, the faster the international prices transmit on
the domestic monetary scene. The last and most crucial element that Petreski (2007)
argues has to be present in a currency union in order for it to have the properties of an
optimal area is political integration. Political integration will lead to a higher chance
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of commitment to joint economic policies, a common fiscal policy, and similarity in
institutions among the member countries. A valid question is if Europe can fulfill
these requirements. As one can see with the experience of the U.S. it takes a long time
to successfully complete the process of establishing a currency union and over time it
will be interesting to see if the euro will manage to become as powerful as the dollar.

C. Government Debt and Common Currencies
i. Why is this different for Countries in Currency Unions Relative to those
with Sovereign Countries?
While they are both large currency unions, the Eurozone is different than the
United States. The Eurozone is only a currency union due to the shared currency and
the common bank that is in charge of monetary policy, the European Central Bank.
The United States is one country consisting of 50 states that share the same political
system as well as the same economic system. Many researchers have compared the
currency unions of the United States and Europe. Mongelli (2002) argues that the
biggest difference between the two powerful currencies is that the single European
currency is shared by a group of sovereign countries that do not form a single state.
This highlights one issue that the Eurozone has encountered; the fact that they are not
under the same political systems like what American citizens are in the U.S. Lars
Jonung and Eoin Drea (2010) argue that the unification of the countries in the
Eurozone was an inherently political process and that there is an inseparability of
politics and economics in the European monetary unification. For example, before the
Eurozone, researchers were concerned with how other big nations in Europe would
handle forming a continental government in which Germany has the largest
population and the strongest economy. Some researchers believed that a political
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union needed to precede a monetary union and that the sustainability of the single
currency would depend on the political will to cooperate of the EU member countries
(Jonung and Drea, 2010). Therefore, the Eurozone currency union meets greater
challenges than what the U.S. did in the development of a shared currency, due to the
fact that in the Eurozone each country has their own set of rules and regulations.
Therefore, whenever a decision is to be made concerning the monetary union it will
have to go through many different governments with different incentives, hence it can
be time-consuming and difficult to get changes implemented. On the other hand, there
are a lot of things that the Eurozone countries can learn from the U.S. currency union
and their experience of becoming the largest reserve in the world.
ii. Lessons from the U.S. Experience
Throughout history there are a few examples of countries or states trying to go
together to form a currency union. As noted above, the most successful example is the
United States. Hugh Rockoff (2000) argues that,
The U.S. is often taken to be the exemplar of the benefits of a monetary union.
Since 1788 Americans have been able to buy and sell goods, travel and invest
within a vast area without ever having to be concerned about changes in
exchange rates. They have had problems, like shocks. But political
considerations have ruled out separate currencies in the United States.
It is clear that to get to the point where the United States’ monetary union is today has
required a long process with a lot of trouble. For example, throughout the first 150
years of the U.S. monetary union, there were several disputes within the country.
Many of them were regional disputes, for example what was considered a good
monetary policy from the point of view of one region was sometimes bad policy from
the point of view of another (Rockoff, 2000). The experience of the United States is
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cited as evidence that in fact the benefits of a monetary union greatly outweigh the
costs. After all, their monetary union has survived since 1788. The problem is that due
to this long process and the several severe conflicts the U.S. had to go through in
order to get to the point where they are today, research has found that it is at best
weak evidence that the net effects of the shared currency in the United States have
been positive (Rockoff, 2000). It can also be said that it took a long time for the U.S.
to develop their currency to be as stable as it is today. For example, Rockoff (2000)
argues that a reasonable minimum time that the U.S. used to establish the position of
the dollar might be one hundred and fifty years. Therefore, it will be a gradual process
for the European monetary union to establish a strong currency for all the member
countries.
However, some research suggests that the Eurozone would be better off with
individual currencies like they had in the past. Jonung and Drea (2010) state that
research has questioned the fiscal federalism under the lessons from the U.S.
experience and several have questioned whether the Eurozone would be better off
sharing a common monetary standard instead of a common currency. They argued
that a common monetary standard is preferable to a common currency because it
respects the fiscal need to keep national central banks and national currencies in place
in highly indebted European countries. Therefore, it is clear that many researchers are
against the shared currency in Europe and share the point of view that a monetary
union is not the preferred option for the Eurozone.
Thomas J. Sargent (2012) argues that another lesson that the Eurozone can learn from
the U.S. experience is:
The ability to borrow today depends on expectations about future revenues
(prospective debt holders rationally anticipate that the government will be

	
  

10

constrained in its ability to raise enough revenues to service the debt), Freerider problems exist for subordinate governments vis-à-vis a central
government (states in the U.S. or nations in the EU cannot be relied on
voluntarily to provide to the central government to pay for public goods, each
state has an incentive to refuse), Good reputations can be costly to acquire
(governments therefore have incentives to earn reputations that they will pay
off their debts in the future), It can help to sustain distinct reputations with
different parties, Confused monetary-fiscal coordination creates uncertainties.
Many researchers have been concerned with the implications for the global position
of the dollar as a result of the introduction of a common European currency. It has
been argued that there is a possibility that the Americans will feel threatened by the
Eurozone currency union. However, in many ways, the U.S. is embracing the
cooperation of the European countries. The Americans have also said that it is
believed that the euro would only have an impact on the dollar as the predominant
means of exchange in international financial transactions in the long run and it would
only occur gradually in a manner that would be easily coped with. Therefore, the
American view on the euro was that it would not present a challenge for the dollar in
the “foreseeable” future. After two years of the euro, in 2001, it was noticed only a
small change in the role of the dollar as the pegged exchange rate for third world
countries or as the globally preferred reserve currency (Jonung and Drea, 2010).
Researchers have also argued that the rise of the euro as an international currency and
competitor for the dollar would only be achieved gradually, and that the position of
the dollar as the lending international currency depended primarily upon the ability of
the U.S. to avoid financial crises and to maintain strong economic performance. Most
research agrees that the establishment of the euro created many new benefits for U.S.
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firms in trade and finance. On the other hand, it is found that the introduction of the
euro will cause a significant drop in the international holdings of dollars. However,
the Americans have also identified the opportunity of a larger market and the removal
of obstacles to trade freely within the European Union’s borders as the future benefits
of European monetary union to U.S. businesses. The official position of the U.S.
government was that the euro was a sign of progress made by the European Union
(Jonung and Drea, 2010). It has been commented that the euro and the dollar will
always be in a struggle for dominance, and the severe decline in the value of the euro
compared to the dollar in the period between 1999 and 2001 triggered a strong debate
about the euro against the dollar. Some people argued that since the euro would create
an integrated currency area greater than the U.S., the euro would quickly rival and
even surpass the dollar as the international reserve currency. It was forecasted that by
2010 the world foreign exchange reserves will consist of 1.2 trillion in dollar, 1.2
trillion in euros, and 0.8 trillion in other currencies. Today, however, the dollar
remains the leading reserve currency (Jonung and Drea, 2010).
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Chapter 2
The Eurozone Crisis
A. Description of the Crisis
The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is comprised of the European
Central Bank (ECB) and the national banks of all EU member countries, whether they
use the euro or not. In countries that use the euro, the national central banks no longer
issue currency. Much of the process of designing the ESCB was based upon
comparisons with the Federal Reserve System. There are a number of similarities
between the two biggest monetary unions in the world. For example, the European
Central Bank and the Federal Reserve both consists of different regions or countries.
The ECB currently has 18 countries within itself and the Federal Reserve is composed
of 12 districts. Each bank is an independent institution with a decentralized structure.
However, these two central banks are characterized by significant differences in many
aspects. The biggest differences between the European and the U.S. central banking
systems are their policy mandates, the concentration of power and the decisionmaking structures (Jonung and Drea, 2010).
The Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank have different objectives
and different methods of achieving these objectives. For example, the primary
objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability within the Eurozone, which they are
doing by trying to keep inflation low and preventing deflation. Jonung and Drea
(2010) argue that the ECB’s clear policy mandate would aid its long-term credibility,
but that the broad diffusion of power might prevent them from resolving future
conflicts between national interests. On the other hand, the Federal Reserve has
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chosen several objectives to pursue such as having a safe, flexible and stable
monetary and financial system (The Federal Reserve System, 1984, 1).
Another issue that has affected the accountability of the ECB compared to the Federal
Reserve is that the Federal Reserve has a very defined process of operating and
everything is going on in between the same borders with the same politics and
decision-making processes. The governors of the Federal Reserve are nominated by
the President and approved by the Senate. Also, the Federal Reserve publishes all the
steps that they take in monetary policy in monthly reports to the Senate, which are
available to the public. In that way it is easier for U.S. citizens to know what is going
on and by making it available to the public, it is evident that they will fit the political
interests of the greatest part of the people.
However, as described earlier, it took the United States a long time to develop
their currency union into today’s strong dollar. The development of the euro in the
Eurozone has already been a long process. In their research, Lars Jonung and Eoin
Drea (2010) argue that the work of all the nations that wanted to be a part of the
Eurozone currency union began in June 1988 when the European Council met in
Hanover, Germany, and set up the Committee for the Study of Economic and
Monetary Union which included all the European Council central bank governors.
This meeting resulted in The Delors Report, named after Jacques Delors, then
president of the European Community. The objective for this process was that they
would create a monetary union in Europe with a possible replacement of national
currencies with a single currency.
The Delors Report included a three-stage program in the development of the
Eurozone currency union that had the ultimate goal of turning Europe into a true
distinct market. The period between 1989 and 2002 has often been divided into two
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phases. The first phase begins with the publication of the Delors Report. In 1992, The
Maastricht Treaty was signed. In this treaty, the European Council governors had
outlined “convergence criteria” for the Eurozone’s transition to become a currency
union. The conditions were based on the rate of inflation, long-term interest rates, and
membership of at least two years in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European
Monetary System before entry into the monetary union. The Maastricht Treaty also
obtained clear limits for the government budget to deficit to GDP and the ratio of
government debt to GDP, which each member country had to stay below. The
margins for the Exchange Rate Mechanism were 2.25 percent above or below a
central rate for most member currencies (Jonung and Drea, 2010).
At this point, there was much debate as to how to implement the euro. During
the modifications of The Maastricht Treaty the strategy discussed that the majority
believed would be most successful implementation of the euro was to allow EU
countries into the monetary union at different times. This idea of a multi-speed
transition to EMU was the most popular proposal due to the fact that through this kind
of transition to a currency union a small group of countries would first form the
fundament of the monetary union, with the other countries joining in over time.
Jonung and Drea (2010) concluded that a multispeed approach was to be expected,
albeit with slightly differing combinations of countries.
In the Maastricht Treaty it was suggested a set of modifications to ensure that
the advantages of joining the currency union would outweigh the disadvantages. The
Madrid Summit of December 1995 concluded the first phase. This event was where
the European Council decided the final timetable for the launching of the euro, which
set the starting date of January 1999 for the euro and for irrevocably fixing the
exchange rates of the currencies of the initial member states seeking to introduce the
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euro. In The Madrid Summit they also decided to call the currency “euro” replacing
the name European Currency Unit (ECU). In May 1998, they selected the countries
that would adopt the euro in January 1999.
The second phase began right after The Madrid Summit and lasted up until
January 2002, when euro notes and coins entered circulation, replacing each of the
independent currencies in the Eurozone countries. This time was chosen for the
launching of the currency union because there existed an opportunity in Europe to
build a currency union among many countries. One of the reasons was due to the fact
that many nations felt a need for monetary unification of Europe because of the
region’s lack of mobility at the time as well as the need to improve the relationships
between countries. Another cause to why it at this point was a unique opportunity to
move towards a single currency in Europe was because of the end of the Soviet
Union, German unification, and growing nominal exchange rate stability in Western
Europe.
However, the implementation of the Eurozone currency union has not always
been a successful integration and many countries are struggling today. When the euro
was initiated, the member countries were imposed with a single currency and fixed
exchange rates. This change imposed problems for some of the member countries
because they now had to follow the monetary policy set by the European Central
Bank and could not adjust it for their needs like they could when the countries had
independent monetary policies. This issue increased the amount of cyclical
unemployment among the countries in the Eurozone. One problem that many have
discussed with the euro is that the monetary policy objective only takes into account
price stability and it does not take into account employment, production or growth. As
earlier described, since the Eurozone countries all have different political systems, it
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is hard to implement changes in monetary policies. Thomas J. Sargent (2012: page 3)
argues that the fiscal institutions in the Eurozone today are similar to those in the U.S.
under the Articles of Confederation, “the power to tax lies with the member states.
Unanimous consent by member states is required for many important EU-wide fiscal
actions.”
As previously mentioned, another potential problem that can result in conflicts
between the countries in the Eurozone is the lack of political integration in the area.
There is a possible conflict with the fact that there will be an inevitable contest for
leadership between the most powerful nations in the Eurozone, such as Germany and
France, which is likely to aggravate tensions within the currency union. Therefore it is
argued that the long run sustainability of the European Monetary Union will depend
on its contribution to long-term political security rather than on any economic success
(Jonung and Drea, 2010). There have been identified three primary factors behind the
desire of member states to join the Eurozone currency union. These includes: the fear
of being left out of a central European Union institution, the fear of losing the support
of the pan-European business community, and the fear of the economic consequences
of losing the benefit of many years of hard work to get into Europe’s monetary club.
It is believed that economic success of the euro would be a potential driver of political
integration in the future (Jonung and Drea, 2010).
As stated above, the U.S. economy has often been used as a benchmark of a
successfully functioning monetary union to compare to how the Eurozone currency
union has progressed. This aspect has especially been the case in the debate of
comparing the development of the Eurozone’s currency union with the Theory of
Optimal Currency Areas that they used in the integration of the dollar in the U.S.
However, Lars Jonung and Eoin Drea (2010) argue that the Eurozone can be labeled
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as a suboptimal currency area. In their article they describe that the Eurozone was
“much less equipped” than the U.S. monetary union to deal with potential
interregional or wider asymmetric shocks. They concluded that this mirrored the
initial U.S. consensus that the Eurozone was a suboptimal currency area. Also,
Jonung and Drea (2010) argued that a major asymmetrical shock would cause the
Eurozone to dissolve. Another argument is that the optimum currency area criteria
were endogenous. Which implies that once a country joins a currency union, its
economy will adjust to the new environment.
The financial crisis of 2008 originated in the American housing market and
developed into a worldwide economic downturn. In his work, Paolo Manasse (2013)
provides a figure that compares the U.S. GDP with the Eurozone GDP from 2006 to
2013.
Figure 1. Comparison of the U.S. GDP and the Eurozone GDP 2006-2013

Source: Manasse (2013)
Figure 1 shows that the global economic crisis began earlier in the U.S. (2007), than
in the Eurozone (2008). Therefore, one can say that the crisis originated in the U.S.
and later spread to the Eurozone. Also, one can see from the figure that the fall in
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output had a larger impact on the Eurozone. Manasse describes this by “The US
economy started recovering from 2009, while in the Eurozone recovery has been
short-lived, and flattens out in 2010” (Manasse, 2013). One can see that this financial
setback had more severe consequences for the Eurozone than the U.S. This problem
has forced certain members of the Eurozone (countries located in the south as well as
Ireland especially) to continuously finance budget deficits due to increasing national
debt. Since the beginning of the crisis, there have been multiple asymmetric shocks to
the economy and the Eurozone still lacks ways of dealing with them. In the article
“Eurozone crisis explained” the situation in Europe is described as,
There was a big build-up of debts in Spain and Italy before 2008, but it had
nothing to do with governments. Instead it was the private sector, companies
and mortgage borrowers, who were taking out loans. Interest rates had fallen
to unprecedented lows in southern European countries when they joined the
Euro. And that encouraged a debt-fuelled boom (BBC News, 2012).

Figure 2. Total Debt as a Percentage of Annual Economic Output for Eurozone
Countries

Source: "Eurozone Crisis Explained." BBC News 19 June 2012: n. pag. Print
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Figure 2, from the same article, displays that the debt of Eurozone countries grew by
very high percentages between 2000 and 2010. As one can see from the figure,
private debt has been the larger issue. However, the Eurozone has been trying
different methods to help prevent further losses for the affected countries. For
example, in 2010 they created a temporary crisis fund called the European Financial
Stability Facility (EFSF). The main concern that the EFSF was going to address and
try to improve was the lack of financial stability for some of the countries in the
Eurozone. To improve this issue, the EFSF was going to provide financial assistance
to Eurozone member countries within the framework of a macro-economic
adjustment program (About EFSF). The EFSF provided cheap loans to the countries
that were most affected by the debt crisis. The countries that received this help
committed themselves to implement powerful changes to the public finances. Thus
far, several countries have used this help. In May 2010, Greece received their first
emergency loan of 110 billion euros from the EFSF, the International Monetary Fund
and the European Central Bank. In November 2010, Ireland received a crisis loan of
85 billion euros and in May 2011 Portugal received a loan of 78 billion euros. In
2012, Spain and Cyprus requested emergency loans for their country’s banks.
i. Detailed Analysis of the Eurozone Financial Crisis
In his speech at the Festival of Economics in Trento, Italy, at June 2nd, 2012,
George Soros explained some of the conflicts that the Eurozone has encountered and
the crisis in more detail. Before the countries entered into the Eurozone and adopted
the euro as their currency, the less economically strong countries in Europe, such as
Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Greece, had to pay a larger amount to be able to borrow
money from the bigger countries such as Germany, France, and United Kingdom.
When the currency union was formed, all the member nations got the advantage of
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being able to borrow at the same rate in between all countries in the union. In his
speech, Soros (2012) argues:
When the euro was introduced the regulators allowed banks to buy unlimited
amounts of government bonds without setting aside any equity capital; and the
central bank accepted all government bonds at its discount window on equal
terms. Commercial banks found it advantageous to accumulate the bonds of
the weaker euro members in order to earn a few extra basis points. That is
what caused interest rates to converge which in turn caused competitiveness to
diverge.
In a way this made Eurozone countries, especially the ones with struggling
economies, believe that bonds for all Eurozone countries are identical; whether they
are sold by Ireland, Spain or Germany they are all the same. Therefore there were
tendencies that banks rushed to lend money to the weaker Eurozone countries, hence
their borrowing costs plummeted (Goldstein, 2012). Up until 2008 it looked like this
prediction was true. During this time period, borrowing costs were almost identical
for all of the countries in the Eurozone (See Figure 3). However, in 2008 this
changed. During the nine years when it looked like all the Eurozone countries were
benefitting from the common currency union, this indicator was wrong because the
countries were actually diverging. In his speech, Soros (2012) argued that,
Germany, struggling with the burdens of reunification, undertook structural
reforms and became more competitive. Other countries enjoyed housing and
consumption booms on the back of cheap credit, making them less
competitive.
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This point shows that the sovereign economies of the member countries in the
Eurozone had extremely different development before and after the implementation of
the euro and this has led to the large gap in the different countries’ reactions today.

Figure 3. Interest Rates on 10-year Government Bonds for Eurozone Countries

Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream
As Figure 3 shows, one can clearly see the divergence of the interest rates on 10-year
government bonds of these different Eurozone countries. This graph shows the
reaction to that all these countries are, in fact, different countries with very different
economies, and therefore not all Eurozone government bonds are identical. In his
speech, Soros (2012) argued that,
It took some time for the financial markets to discover that government bonds,
which had been considered riskless, are subject to speculative attack and may
actually default; but when they did, risk premiums rose dramatically. This
rendered commercial banks whose balance sheets were loaded with those
bonds potentially insolvent. And that constituted the two main components of
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the problem confronting us today: a sovereign debt crisis and a banking crisis,
which are closely interlinked.
Therefore, the core of the European financial crisis is the two related problems with
rising borrowing costs for the weaker countries in the Eurozone, and the banks that
had already loaned money to these countries were now going to start struggling. As
mentioned previously, certain nations were affected worse than others, and the next
section describes this point.

B. This Disparate Experience of Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Greece
Data from Eurostat show that the current unemployment rate in the European
Union is 10.7% (Seghi and Burn-Muldoch, 2013), which means that a large part of
the people that wants to work are currently unable to find work. Compared to the
other Eurozone countries, the unemployment rate is extremely high in Ireland,
Portugal, Spain and Greece. With Spain and Greece being the countries with the
highest unemployment rate: they both currently have an unemployment rate above
26%. Figure 4 on the next page shows that Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Greece are
the four countries in the Eurozone with the highest and fastest rising unemployment
rates. If this trend continues, there is only a matter of time until other countries, such
as Germany, who has a relatively stable unemployment rate now, will be dragged
down together with the countries that are struggling.
Increasing unemployment rates are a big problem that the Eurozone members
have encountered and one can now see how important it is for the nations with weaker
economies that have adopted the euro to be quick to adapt to changes and respond to
the euro crisis for their future welfare. Differences between countries such as Spain,
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal compared to countries such as Germany and France is
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Figure 4. Eurozone Unemployment Rates 1990-2011

Source: Shedlock
that the first group of countries does not have the same financial resources to protect
themselves and their own interests in difficult financial times. Hence, as figure 4
shows, weaker countries such as Spain, Greece, and Ireland have continued to diverge
from more powerful nations such as Germany and France. The same figure
demonstrates that it is over the period since around 2007 that the divergence in the
unemployment rates has become very clear and this trend has become more and more
extreme.
An interesting measure to look at is the debt to GDP ratios of the nations in the
Eurozone in order to get an idea of the development the different countries have had
under the currency union. The debt to GDP ratio provides an indication of the ability
for a country to pay back its future debt. It is a good way to compare the different
experiences that the member countries have had with the implementation of the
common currency. In his research Robin Emmott (2013) argues,
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A divide now exists between France and Germany on the one hand, where
debt fell slightly in the third quarter from the second, and the economies of
Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, whose debt-to-GDP ratio rose in the
July-September period. In Ireland, there was a burst real estate bubble, which
forced the country into an international bailout, reached 117 per cent of
economic output in the quarter, while the number was 127 per cent in Italy.
Spain saw its burden tick up to 77 per cent of GDP, and the Commission sees
it reaching 97 per cent in 2014. Greece’s debt rose to 153 per cent of GDP in
the quarter and will reach 189 percent in 2014, although a deal struck by euro
zone finance ministers and the International Monetary Fund in November aims
to take it down to 124 per cent by 2020. Rising debt is particularly worrying
for Italy and Spain, the euro zone’s fourth- and fifth-largest economies, which
are in recession and need growth to cut debt and unemployment.
Due to the fact that the economies of Spain, Ireland, Greece, and Portugal have
struggled a lot after the economic crisis in 2008, it is interesting to look more in detail
on their debt to GDP ratio. Table 1 provides the debt to GDP ratios for some of the
Eurozone countries taken from Eurostat data.
Table 1. Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP Eurozone Countries 2012
and 2013
Government Debt as % of GDP
2012Q1
2012Q4
2013Q1
Spain
73
84,2
88,2
Ireland
106,8
117,4
125,1
Greece
136,5
156,9
160,5
Portugal
112,3
123,8
127,2
Germany
81,1
81,9
81,2
France
88,9
90,2
91,9
United Kingdom
85,1
88,8
88,2
Source: Eurostat
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The values in Table 1 demonstrates that the debt to GDP ratios of Ireland, Greece,
Portugal, and Spain have all been rising significantly over the period measured, while
the debt to GDP ratios of Germany, France, and United Kingdom have remained more
stable. In the first quarter of 2013, Ireland’s debt to GDP ratio was 125.1%, for
Greece it was 160.5%, and for Portugal it was 127.2%. These values are extremely
high, suggesting that these countries are struggling with repaying their debt. Spain’s
debt to GDP ratio in the first quarter of 2013 was 88.2%, which is not as high as the
other three countries just discussed. However, looking at the evident upward trend in
the values of this measure that Spain has experienced, this increasing level of debt has
the potential to develop into a problem for the country. Figure 5 below displays how
the curve for the debt to GDP ratios for Portugal, Greece, Ireland, and Spain are
steeper than the curves for Germany, France, and United Kingdom. It is this growing
trend that is alarming for these four countries.

Figure 5. Debt to GDP Ratio for Eurozone Countries 2012Q1-2013Q1
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Source: Eurostat
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Figure 6 below compares the debt to GDP ratio for some of the Eurozone countries.
The high values of Greece, Ireland and Portugal clearly stand out here. Spain lies a
little under the other nations on this graph, but one has to consider the fact that after
2011 the nation’s debt to GDP ratio has increased significantly. What is interesting to
see here is the difference from year to year between the distinct countries and again
one can see that Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain are the countries with the
highest increase from year to year.

Figure 6. Debt to GDP Ratio for Selected European Countries

	
  	
  
Source: Data from Eurostat
Figure 7 on the following page demonstrates the estimates for the 2013 debt to GDP
ratio for many of the same Eurozone countries as well as other big countries in the
rest of the world. As one can see, many of the same Eurozone countries that have
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been discussed previously are ranked high when comparing their debt to GDP ratios
with other countries in the world as well.

Figure 7. Estimate of the 2013 Debt to GDP Ratio for Selected Countries in the
World

Source: Wang, Data taken from OECD database
Figure 8 on the next page also displays data over a longer time period where one can
see the development of the debt to GDP ratio of these different Eurozone member
nations. These four nations are what I am going to compare in the rest of this thesis in
order to figure out what has caused this deeper recession that Spain has experienced
compared to France, Germany, and United Kingdom. I chose to use France, Germany,
and United Kingdom as comparisons to Spain’s data because these countries will give
me a better picture of what issues have caused the problems in Spain. All of these
countries have large economies that all are a big part of the total Eurozone economy.
However, they each also have very distinct differences. Germany is the country that
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Figure 8. Debt to GDP Ratio Eurozone Countries 2006-2013
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one would think is the closest to the trend and is therefore a good comparison for
Spain in terms of seeing what periods the country has had its largest problems. United
Kingdom is a country that has its own monetary policy and has a much freer labor
market than what Spain has, therefore we can expect United Kingdom and Spain to be
quite different in many areas. France is expected to be similar to Spain in many areas,
however as the data shows, this will indicate what areas that have caused Spain to
suffer after the implementation of the euro.

C. A Europe-Wide Solution – Monetary Policy
Charles Wyplosz, at the time he was president of the Bundesbank, portrayed
the first decade of the Eurozone currency union as nine successful years followed by a
destructive tenth year. Wyplosz argued that the success the currency union
experienced during the first nine years was due to price stability and improved trade
and financial integration. Although he thought that it was debatable whether this
acceptable implementation was due to “good luck, good policies or both,” he
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concluded that the Eurozone had “operated better than most observers had predicted”
(Jimeno, 2000). One problem that especially the smaller peripheral countries have
encountered is that the control that individual countries have over the common
monetary policy for the Eurozone is very small. A more powerful economic country,
like for example Germany, is more likely to dominate due to the fact that Germany
had the best monetary policy to begin with so in many ways this country has more to
say when implementing big decisions. This problem is often referred to as the
competitiveness crisis where the imbalance between the different Eurozone countries
is a possible source of conflict. In the future development of the currency union it will
be important to equalize the power relationships between the member nations.
After interviewing many people to get different point of views, Lars Jonung and Eoin
Drea (2010) concluded in their research that the currency union in the Eurozone
would encounter a lot of difficulties due to the fact that there is a significant
difference between the needs of monetary policy between two countries such as
Ireland and Italy, and with one single currency one cannot have that. Therefore, it will
be hard to implement a common monetary policy that will solve the problems for
each of the individual member countries in the Eurozone. Hence, this point illustrates
that the common monetary policy imposed on all the member countries is the main
issue that has led to some countries struggling more than others, as is the case for
Spain.
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Chapter 3
Spain
A. Spain’s Experience in the Eurozone
Spain has been progressing economically since the early 1960s. The Spanish
Civil War ended in 1939 with the dictator Francisco Franco and the nationalists
continuing to have the power in the country. The war was followed by a period of
famine consistent of food shortages resulting in approximately 200,000 Spaniards
dying. This period is therefore referred to as Los Años de Hambre, or the years of
hunger. The nation’s rapid economic development after the civil war and the years of
starvation has become known as the “Spanish miracle”. The determinant factor for
Spain to achieve an increase in economic growth occurred in 1959 when Franco
decided to rely less on the country’s various ideologies and give more authority to the
Francoist technocrats. Most of these technocrats were members of the influential
catholic group, the Opus Dei or the Work of God. This event resulted in that the
Spanish government began to include more people that were working towards a
modernized country. With this increase in authority that the technocrats had been
given, they were able to move Spain towards a more modernized country. The
technocrats introduced many new development strategies, such as convincing the rest
of the country to adopt a free market economy, increasing competition, and having a
closer relationship with other European countries. By increasing the cooperation with
other countries, more international corporations decided to expand their businesses to
Spain. These reforms resulted in an increase in growth. They also altered the
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monetary policy of the country by closely following the guidelines of the
International Monetary Fund. These new implementations resulted in the Spanish
economic boom. At this time, Spain was suffering from overpopulation. Due to the
change in economic policies, a lot of Spaniards moved to other countries and sent
money back home to their families, which helped the economy recover. Another
aspect that helped boosting the Spanish economy was the increased attention to
introduce Spain as an attractive tourist destination.
Spain became a member of the European Union in 1986 along with Portugal.
Spain was among the first 11 countries to adopt the euro as their currency on 1st
January 1999, and introduced notes and coins in 2002. Since its entry, the country’s
economy has prospered in many areas, such as manufacturing, agriculture, mining,
the services sector, and heavy industry (Marca España). Over the last couple of years
Spain has had one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Looking at GDP,
Spain is today the fifth largest economy in Europe, and represents 9% of the total
economy in Europe. France, Germany and Italy are Spain’s most important trading
partners. Half of Spain’s production comes from the autonomies located in the north
of Spain: Catalonia and the Basque country. Catalonia has such a strong economy due
to its diverse offering for tourists with both the nice Mediterranean beaches and the
Pyrenees to enjoy. Also, this region has a strong manufacturing sector. The Basque
country has the highest level of income per capita in Spain and the unemployment
rate is much lower than in the rest of the country, approximately the same as the
Eurozone average. This region has done well due to their strategic placement in the
country and a strong industrial sector because of access to iron and minerals.
Barcelona is the commercial center of Spain and is considered to be an important
economic driver of the European economy.
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As mentioned above, the Spanish economy has had a lot of problems since the
entry into the Eurozone. However, there are a lot of people that do not think that the
decision for Spain to join the currency union in Europe was all bad. Luis Ángel Rojo,
who was Governor of Banco de España when the Maastricht Treaty was signed, set
Spain’s participation in EMU in a historical perspective. He described the challenges
that Spain faced to join the monetary union as a founding member, and clearly
identified the advantages of integration, on the basis that macroeconomic stability was
a necessary condition for sustained economic growth. He indicated that, despite all
the difficulties that had to be overcome during the transition to EMU, such as
correcting large macroeconomic imbalances and imposing strong budgetary
consolidation, he considered the efforts worthwhile (Jimeno, 2000).
However, as previously mentioned, Spain has encountered a lot of problems in
recent years. The period from 2008 to the present has been described as the Spanish
financial crisis due to many factors. The crisis was a reaction to long-term loans, the
real estate crash, and a very high increase in unemployment. In February 2009, the
downturn in Spain’s economy had gone so far that the nation, among other countries
in Europe, entered into a recession. Although Spain has often been described as a
European success story, the success proved to be unstable as this real estate bubble
drove much of its growth. The article “An overview of Spain’s economy” describes:
The real estate bubble was caused by a combination of low interest rates,
financial deregulation, rising domestic incomes as well as strong demand from
foreign investors, and overshadowed Spain's falling competitiveness. In
addition, many of the new jobs created were restricted to low-wage, lowproductivity parts of the economy, such as construction and domestic services,
while other more lucrative economic sectors remained sluggish. Eventually,
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the burst of the housing bubble and the global financial crisis brought the
Spanish economy into a severe downturn (Scios, 2012).
The development of real estate prices in Spain saw its most crucial period between
1996 and 2007 when prices rose by 200%. Therefore, one can conclude that after the
burst of the housing bubble in 2007/2008, Spain’s economy has encountered severe
challenges.
The other problem that Spain has struggled with is their extremely high
unemployment rate. The Department of Labor reported in January 2012 that the
number of unemployed in Spain was 4.98 million, an increase of more than 132,000
people from the month before. The rise in real estate prices combined with the
subsequent crash and the extremely high unemployment rate have heavily impacted
the livelihood of Spanish citizens. Since October 2008 the unemployment rate has
continued to increase. By March 2012, Spain’s unemployment rate reached 24.4%,
which is twice the Eurozone average. As Figure 9 below shows, since the financial
crisis in 2008 Spain’s unemployment rate has diverged dramatically from most of the
other Eurozone countries. In 2013, Spain’s unemployment rate was as high as 26.7%.
Figure 9. Unemployment Rate Eurozone Countries 2001-2013
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In the Spanish labor market there are distinct groups of the labor force that are
suffering more. For example, female and youth unemployment rates have been about
10 to 20 percent higher than the aggregate unemployment. The most alarming feature
of the Spanish labor market is that the unemployment rate for those Spaniards less
than 25 years is around 50%. These young people are the most educated generation
that the country has ever had, yet they face the highest rate of unemployment in
Europe. The article in the Spanish newspaper El País “El paro juvenil sigue
subiendo” describes that the unemployment rate for the Spanish population under 25
years has increased to 53.28% (Romero, 2012), which means that more than half of
the people under 25 years old that want to work in Spain, do not have the opportunity
to do so. Figure 10 shows this development.

Figure 10. European Youth Unemployment 1983-2013

Source: Thompson (2013)
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This problem has led to that a large amount of the highly educated Spaniards leave the
country to search for better job opportunities. Recent numbers from OECD shows that
the number of people leaving the country has taken over the number of arrivals, hence
Spain is now a net emigrant country (La OCDE constata emigración neta por primera
vez en España en 2011 de más de 50.000 personas por la crisis).
Another consequence is that highly educated people settle for jobs that pay
minimum pay. This issue is often referred to as “over-qualification” and one can see
that many people with college degrees have to settle for jobs that require no skills. A
big concern among the Spanish population is that this generation will be known as the
“Lost Generation” because of their constant search for jobs that will lead to that in the
future they will be closed off from good careers. This problem also has another
downside due to the fact that since there is not enough work, overeducated people end
up having to take on lower paying jobs. When there is excess supply of labor, it is
likely that highly educated workers who cannot find a job will accept jobs below their
skill levels at the cost of “crowding out” lower educated workers who therefore
become unemployed (Jimeno, Felgueroso, Dolado, 2000).
The fact that unemployment rates for lower (primary) educated and higher
(tertiary/university) educated workers have quadrupled and tripled respectively over
the last twenty years, and all despite a huge educational drive, can possibly be
explained by a combination of three factors: (i) labor market institutional factors
(fixed-term employment contracts, wage bargaining, etc.), (ii) skilled biased
technological progress, and (iii) over-education and crowding-out of lower educated
workers by higher educated ones who replace the former in their traditional entry jobs
and engage into on-the-job search (Jimeno, Felgueroso, Dolado, 2000).
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Together with the high Spanish unemployment rate, other measures also show
the worsening conditions in Spain. For example, the GDP per capita in Spain is also
lower than these other comparison countries as Figure 11 shows and appears to be
slightly diverging.

Figure 11. GDP Per Capita Eurozone Countries 2008-2012 (in US$)
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As well as the unemployment rate comparison above, the real GDP growth rate
shown in Figure 12 on the next page shows the issues Spain is encountering in the
near future. Figure 12 demonstrates the difficulties that Spain has had since the
recovery phase after the economic crisis in 2008. Since 2010 one can clearly see that
the growth rate of Spain has diverged from those of Germany, France, and United
Kingdom and has continued to be negative since then. What has made this issue
unfold is what will demonstrate whether the domestic problems that some of the
Eurozone countries are experiencing are due to the common monetary policy or if it is
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Figure 12. Real GDP Growth Rate Eurozone Countries 2003-2013
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due to country-specific policies. The question that I will look at in the next sections is
could it be that this deeper recession that Spain has experienced is due to structural
problems or is it due to the membership of Spain in the European Union and hence
suboptimal policy.

B. Detailed Analysis of the Spanish Labor Market
In this section, I have researched different parts of the Spanish labor market in
order to figure out the reasons for the issues that can be observed in the country today.
First, I looked at the importance of employment protection legislation for the
unemployment rate. I found that the high level of temporary contracts in Spain,
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combined with the reluctance to get rid off permanent workers are the two main
problems for the country. To further explore this issue, I looked at a framework
developed by Holt and Hendrickson (2014) which show that if costs associated with
firing workers increase this results in a permanent higher unemployment rate.
Second, I calculated the labor wedge for four Eurozone countries. This
measure is important because taxes cause inefficiencies in the economy. This
tendency is due to the fact that workers do not get to keep all of their income because
of the taxes they have to pay, which, given that the substitution effect is dominant,
will result in workers having an incentive to work less and consume more leisure.
However, my results showed that the labor wedge couldn’t explain why Spain has
entered into a deeper recession than other Eurozone countries such as France, United
Kingdom, and Germany because Spain actually had the lowest labor wedge of these
countries.
Third, I looked at the price level and how it has differed from country to
country after the implementation of the euro. To do this, I compared the price level in
different Eurozone countries relative to the counterfactual. In order to explain the
effect of an event in economics it is useful to compare what actually happened to what
would have happened if the event had not occurred. Therefore, it is helpful to use a
counterfactual, which provides us with the trend of the measurement that is under
investigation if it would have continued on the same path as it historically had been.
In this thesis, the counterfactual was constructed by assuming that the price level
would have remained on the same path that it had been for the past 20 years. This
trend helped me be able to find the deviations from trend for Spain, France, Germany,
and United Kingdom. What I found here was that all the countries are still below
trend, however Spain is dramatically lower than any of the other nations.
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i. OECD Regulations in Force on 1st January 2013 in Spain
In 2013, new regulations that affected the Spanish labor market were
implemented. One distinct feature of the Spanish labor market is that the workers get
a lot of compensation in severance pay “Workers dismissed for “objective” reasons:
2/3 of a month’s pay per year of service up to a minimum of 12 months” (OECD page
88). This aspect makes it costly to fire permanent workers in Spain and therefore one
can see that there is a significant larger part of temporary contracts in this country
compared to other European countries. Severance pay for people that have been
dismissed unfairly is even longer, “The level for severance pay concerning unfair
dismissal is calculated as 33 days pay per year of service with the upper limit of 24
months pay” (OECD page 89) and for some contracts entered into prior to 12
February 2012 the maximum severance pay amount can be up to 42 months pay.
When employers have to pay their employees for such a long time period after firing
them, it gives them an incentive not to fire their employees even if they are not being
as efficient as would be optimal.
Another regulation that makes it costly for Spanish companies to fire
employees is the length of the trial period for dismissal, which is very long in Spain.
For example, a new type of employment contract was created in 2012, called the
Permanent Employment Contract to Support Entrepreneurs. This contract is available
exclusively to small and medium-sized enterprises with less than 50 employees that
did not make unfair or collective dismissals in the 6 months preceding hiring. This
contract sets the duration of trial period to 1 year, which is a long time. This implies
that the business has to keep paying the employee for one year due to the lengthy
process of getting a worker fired. This is good for workers because they are highly
protected against losing their jobs, but it is also not efficient because it is hard for
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companies to get rid of workers that they do not feel they need. When workers get a
long time in notice before dismissal it means that they are taking up the spots for
more qualified and efficient workers that could have increased productivity. Because
of this trend of a longer time associated with firing a worker, it has resulted in that the
Spanish companies are more critical when hiring new workers due to the increased
cost of getting rid of employees that are doing a dissatisfactory job. On the other
hand, this tendency could also lead to an increased competition for high salary paying
jobs. If this were the case, it could increase the productivity of a country because it
would give workers an incentive to push themselves harder to obtain these top
positions. However, in Spain today it is apparent that the longer time associated with
firing a worker has resulted in an increased scrutiny by employers when hiring new
workers.
As discussed above, Spain has a large part of temporary contracts compared to
other Eurozone countries. One of the features that also were discussed in these new
regulations from the OECD is the long training contracts in the Spanish labor market,
which can be looked at as a form of temporary contract that has a long time that it can
be in effect: “Training contracts: may be extended for six months up to two years, or
three years by collective agreement, and up to four years for workers with
disabilities” (OECD page 89). There are also no restrictions on the number of
renewals or prolongations of temporary work assignments: “No limitation for
renewals of contracts between the agency and the worker” (OECD page 89). Also, the
condition of becoming a permanent worker is very extensive:
Workers who – within a period of 30 months – had been hired during a period
longer than 24 months, with or without continuity, for the same or different
occupation within the same firm or group of companies and have been hired
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directly either on two or more fixed-term contracts or being placed at disposal
by temporary work agencies with the same or different type of fixed-term
contract will acquire the condition of permanent workers (OECD page 90).
The implications of this statement is that it is easy for a Spanish company to argue
that an employee that has been a worker in the firm for several years is still under a
temporary contract because of all these conditions that one have to fulfill in order to
become a permanent worker. That means that, if the company enters an economic
downturn, it will be easier for them to fire these employees because the employer can
argue that they are still under temporary contracts.
As mentioned earlier, in Spain today it is extremely hard to get rid of
permanent workers: “Replacement contract for workers near retirement: time left until
the replaced worker reaches the age of 65, i.e. up to a maximum of 48 to 52 months,
according to the age of the worker who retires” (OECD page 89). In Spain, it is
currently hard for many corporations to fire employees that have been in the
corporation for many years due to strong relationships. Here, it is assumed that the
company would rehire and not eliminate the position to cut labor costs because of the
many disadvantages associated with downsizing for a company. These disadvantages
include lost business because of fewer available salespeople, a decrease in innovation
because there are not enough people working on research and development, and
reduced productivity due to the decreased work-morale associated with having
workers laid off. Hence, the fact that these permanent workers are able to sit in their
jobs for as long as they want has developed into a problem in the Spanish labor
market because it forces younger and more qualified workers to settle for lower-paid
jobs.
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ii. Current State of the Spanish Labor Market
The current state of the Spanish labor market is problematic. The Spanish
labor market is highly dual, with about 30 percent of the labor force in temporary or
fixed-term contracts. This is the highest level in the EU15 since the mid-1980s, and
about double the EU15 average. Florence Jaumotte (2011) suggests that the key
reform for lowering the unemployment rate in Spain is to reduce the share of
temporary workers by lowering the high employment protection of permanent
workers. This point is important in my analysis because it suggests that temporary
employment will increase when the costs associated with hiring and firing permanent
workers increase. This issue will result in a reluctance for employers to hire new
workers and create more jobs. The reality for many Spanish workers today is that they
are forced to take on temporary contracts, which comes with great uncertainties about
the future. This job instability that many Spanish workers are facing today is an
incredibly stressful reality to live in. By lowering the protection of permanent
workers, it does not necessarily mean that it will result in firing these workers. It
implies that more jobs in Spain can be qualified as permanent positions, due to the
reduced conditions that a job has to fulfill in order to become a permanent position.
This further implies that more jobs will be created and Spanish labors will face less
instability in the job market. However, Jaumotte also argues that to reduce the
unemployment rate, the decreased protection of permanent workers has to be
combined with a decentralization of the collective bargaining in the workplace. The
collective bargaining refers to the discussion between the employer and the employee
to determine wage, hours worked, and other conditions for the workers. This will
result in the Spanish labor market being more dynamic and responsive to labor market
changes. Due to the fact that a higher share of part-time workers is positively
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associated with lower unemployment then to try to raise the number of part-time
workers could be something worth trying as well. This fact is because a part-time
worker is not looked at as an unemployed worker, hence, having more people in parttime positions will lower the unemployment rate for the country.
In their paper Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado, and Barbanchon (2010) argue that the
difference between the unemployment in Spain and France can be accounted for by
the difference in employment protection legislation between the two countries. A
response due to a combination of the larger gap between the dismissal costs of
workers with permanent and temporary workers and the laxer rules on the use of
temporary contracts in Spain than in France. The idea is further developed by
Blanchard and Jimeno (1995) who argue that Portugal and Spain have had remarkable
similar histories over the last 20 years, however Portugal has the lowest
unemployment rate of 6.8% and Spain has the highest on of 24.4% in the Eurozone.
This paper argues that the different combinations of unemployment protection and
unemployment benefits can explain the magnitude of the difference in the
unemployment between the two countries.
Research has been conducted on how a country’s employment protection
legislation can affect its unemployment rate. One framework, developed by Holt and
Hendrickson (2014) describes this issue by identifying that if costs for employers to
fire their employees increase, it will result in employers not being willing to alter their
production and be very careful before hiring new employees. Increased firing costs
can come from different administrative costs associated with firing people, such as,
for example, severance packages and having a long time notice before dismissal. In
this framework, it is demonstrated that an increase in the costs associated with firing a
worker will result in a permanent higher unemployment rate. Hence, this framework
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argues that although the primary goal of the Employment Protection Legislation
(EPL) policies is to reduce the incidence of unemployment, it can actually have the
opposite effect.
The Harlan and Hendrickson (2014) framework includes two graphs, shown in
Figure 13 on the next page. The first graph includes the wage curve and the job
creation curve. Real wage is on the vertical axis and labor market tightness is on the
horizontal axis. The wage curve has a positive slope because as vacancy increases,
employers need more workers, resulting in the employees to be in a position to
negotiate higher wages. The job creation curve is downward sloping because it
demonstrates that the firm is willing to create more jobs when the wage is lower. The
graph on the right hand side, displays the vacancy rate on the vertical axis and the
unemployment rate on the horizontal axis. The Beveridge Curve shows the possible
combinations of unemployment rates and vacancy rates in equilibrium. The tightness
curve is a straight line from the origin that has a slope equal to the labor market
tightness parameter. The intersection between these two curves determines the
equilibrium vacancy rate and unemployment rate, as Figure 13 shows.
As described above, this framework shows that the effect of a stricter
Employment Protection Legislation will shift the wage curve up since workers are in
a position to negotiate for a higher wage at any level of labor market tightness. Due to
the better protection of the workers, the associated wages for all workers will increase
because the employer takes this into account when hiring new employees. This results
in a downward shift in the job creation curve because it increases the costs of both
hiring and firing a worker and therefore the firm is willing to pay less to the worker
than they were previously. As one can see from Figure 14 on the next page, the
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Figure 13. Employment Protection Legislation Framework 1

Source: Holt and Hendrickson (2014)

Figure 14. Employment Protection Legislation Framework 2

Source: Holt and Hendrickson (2014)
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intersection between the wage curve and the job creation curve, which determines the
equilibrium real wage and labor tightness, will result in decrease in the labor market
tightness parameter. The effect on the real wage is ambiguous because it depends on
how much each curve shifts. This transfers over to the graph on the right hand side
with having the tightness curve rotate down as an effect of what happened in the
previous graph. As Figure 14 on the previous page shows, this results in a decrease in
the vacancy rate, and a permanent increase in the unemployment rate.
This framework implies that due to the higher cost associated with each
employee the vacancy will fall. This will result in a permanent increase in
unemployment rate due to these EPL policies. Hence, this framework can explain that
part of the extremely high unemployment rate in Spain is a result of the country’s
strict employment protection legislation.
To further display the significant difference between the share of temporary
employment compared to the total unemployment rate, I looked at the differences
between Spain, France, Germany, and United Kingdom on this matter. I have put the
results together in Figure 15 on the next page.
Figure 15 displays the problem earlier discussed with Spanish labor markets.
As the graphs show, it seems like that in countries as for example Spain, France, and
Germany, where there is significant labor market regulation, one can observe a strong
relationship between unemployment and temporary employment. Whereas one do not
observe the same tendency with respect to the United Kingdom, which is a country
with a much freer labor market. One can also see from the graph that the share of
temporary employment in Spain is higher than in any of the other countries.
I also looked at other indicators that can potentially explain some of Spain’s
problems. First, I found the average ratio of the strictness of regulations on permanent

	
  

48

Figure 15. Share of Temporary Employment Compared to the Total
Unemployment Rate Eurozone Countries 2001-2011
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employment relative to the same measure for temporary employment. As shown
below, this will give us some more indicators of how the Spanish labor market has
done since the euro was implemented relative to other Eurozone countries. This is
shown in Table 2 and Figure 16.
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United
Kingdom
Share of
temporary
employment

Table 2. Average Strictness of Regulations on Permanent Employment
Compared to Average Strictness of Regulations on Temporary Employment
Eurozone Countries
ASRPE
ASRTE
Spain
2,747
3,321
France
2,392
3,509
United Kingdom
1,106
0,297
Germany
2,715
2,228
Source: Data from Eurostat (ASRPE: Average strictness of regulations on permanent
employment, ASRTE: Average strictness of regulations on temporary employment)

Figure 16. Average Strictness of Regulations on Permanent Employment
Compared to Average Strictness of Regulations on Temporary Employment
Eurozone Countries
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On the following page, I have calculated the average ratio of the strictness of
regulations on permanent employment relative to the same measure for temporary
employment, shown in Figure 17.
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Table 4. Average Strictness of Regulations on Permanent Employment Divided
by Average Strictness of Regulations on Temporary Employment Eurozone
Countries
ASRPE/ASRTE
Spain
0,827169467
France
0,68177887
United Kingdom
3,720267246
Germany
1,218200186
Source: Data from Eurostat

Figure 17. Average Strictness of Regulations on Permanent Employment Divided
by Average Strictness of Regulations on Temporary Employment Eurozone
Countries
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If I had found here that this measure was much larger for Germany than Spain and
France, this would have given some indication of structural problems. However, what
we see here is that this measure is much larger for United Kingdom than the other
three countries and Germany’s measure is higher than both Spain’s and France’s
measures. This might be indicative that what one can observe here is the dynamic
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response to a bigger shock. This gives credence to the idea that this is a EU problem
rather than simply a Spanish problem.
iii. Calculation of the Labor Wedge
To go further into the analysis of the Spanish labor market it is interesting to
look at the labor wedge. In his work, Loukas Karabarbounis (2013) defined the labor
wedge as the gap between the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption and the marginal product of labor caused by taxes. In equilibrium, the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure equals the marginal
product of labor. However, taxes generate a wedge between these values that causes
inefficiencies in the economy. The inefficiencies occur since the marginal product of
labor is no longer equal to the marginal rate of substitution.
If taxes in an economy increase, it results in a decrease in the real wage. The
effect for the workers is that it reduces the cost of leisure and the benefit of working
many hours declines. However, the effect that taxes have on a country’s economy
depends on whether the substitution effect or the income effect is dominant in the
nation. The substitution effect implies that there is a negative relationship between the
real wage and leisure. Hence, if the real wage decreases, a worker is going to have an
incentive to substitute labor for leisure. Therefore, if the substitution effect is the
dominant effect in a country’s economy, an increase in taxes will result in a decrease
in hours worked. The income effect suggests that when a country experiences an
increase in taxes, and hence a lower wage, workers will decrease their consumption of
goods and leisure will go down. Therefore, if the income effect is the dominant effect
in the country’s economy, an increase in taxes will lead to an increase in hours
worked. In his research, Edward C. Prescott (2004) found that compared to
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Americans, Europeans work less hours. He found that the reason was due to the tax
rate and these effects previously described. In his research, Prescott compared actual
hours worked to the predicted amount of hours worked in the periods 1970-1974 and
1993-1996 for different countries. The results showed that between these two periods,
the European countries had a much larger decline in hours worked than what the U.S.
showed. Prescott concluded in his research that the European countries had
experienced higher tax rates. Also, this made it possible to determine that the
substitution effect was dominant in the European countries because the increase in
taxes resulted in a decrease in hours worked (Prescott, 2004).
Therefore, one can assume that if the substitution effect is dominant in the
Eurozone countries, an increase in taxes will give the workers an incentive to prefer
more leisure and therefore the result is fewer hours worked. This demonstrates how I
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work in a year is 5 ⇤ 16 ⇤ 52 = 4, 160. Thus, to calculate h take the total number of hours worked per
person per year and divide this number by 4,160. One can then use this normalized measure of hours,
amount of time available equal to the total number of potential hours. For example,
the parameter values above, and the consumption-to-GDP ratio to calculate ⌧ .

let’s assume that workers can work 5 days per week and that they must get 8 hours of
2

sleep per day. Thus, the total number of hours that someone could work in a year is 5
∗ 16 ∗ 52 = 4, 160. Thus, to calculate h take the total number of hours worked per
2

person per year and divide this number by 4,160. One can then use this normalized
measure of hours, the parameter values above, and the consumption-to-GDP ratio to
calculate τ.
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iv. Calculations of the Labor Wedge for Spain, Germany, France, and United
Kingdom
Table 2 below demonstrates the values of the Labor Wedge calculated for
Germany, France, Spain, and United Kingdom.
Table 2. Labor Wedge Calculated for Eurozone Countries 2002-2012
Labor Wedge = 1 - (1/LaborShare)*(c/y)*[h/(1-h)]
Germany
France Spain United Kingdom
2002
0.661
0.657 0.521
0.546
2003
0.659
0.655 0.533
0.555
2004
0.661
0.647 0.536
0.557
2005
0.660
0.647 0.545
0.557
2006
0.668
0.656 0.553
0.565
2007
0.680
0.653 0.559
0.563
2008
0.678
0.649 0.559
0.571
2009
0.677
0.648 0.561
0.568
2010
0.676
0.646 0.548
0.567
2011
0.677
0.648 0.534
0.577
2012
0.679
0.649
0.557
Average
0.670
0.651 0.545
0.562
Source: Data from Eurostat
These measures for the labor wedges in the different countries indicate that the
differences in unemployment do not seem to be explained by the labor wedge. Thus,
while employment protection might help explain the differences in unemployment,
the labor wedge does not. This is because the average value for Spain is actually the
lowest of all the values calculated. This implies that the labor wedge is not what has
caused the deeper recession that Spain has experienced compared to France, United
Kingdom, and Germany. In the next section I will look at another indicator of whether
it is the membership in the Eurozone that is the main cause of the problems in Spain
and therefore a suboptimal policy or if it is more evidence for country-specific issues.
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v. Price Level Trend for Spain, Germany, France, and United Kingdom
Another data set that I looked at is the trend in the price levels for Spain,
France, Germany, and United Kingdom. The price level is something that the central
bank can control, therefore by looking at the tendency of inflation over the period
after the implementation of the euro in these countries I can find some indication of
the effect of the European Central Bank policy on its member countries. First, I used
the price level for each country by taking data on each country’s Consumer Price
Index and found inflation by taking the percentage difference between each year.
Then I looked at the period between 2002 and 2012 to see how much the price level
changed from year to year over this period compared to a trend that shows what
would have happened using the 20 year average rate of inflation. The counterfactual
was constructed by normalizing the initial Consumer Price Index from 2002 to one.
Then the trend was found by assuming that the price level would grow at the 20-year
average rate of inflation. Since the actual price level was normalized to 1, the initial
observation for the trend and the actual series are equal. This comparison of the actual
price level and the trend of what would have happened give us an indication of what
actually happened and what one would have predicted could have happened if there
had been no crisis. Then the deviation from trend was found, and this shows us the
percentage deviation of the price level from trend. The deviation from trend is shown
in Figure 18. This graph shows that the trend in the inflation rate for all the countries
fell below the trend during the financial crisis. However, it is evident that Germany,
France, and United Kingdom have gotten back closer to trend than what Spain has.
Figure 17 demonstrates that all of these countries are still below the counterfactual,
however the deviation is much larger for Spain than for the other countries. This
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illustrates that monetary policy has been tighter in Spain than in these other Eurozone
countries.
Figure 18. Deviations of the Price Level From Trend Eurozone countries 20032012

Deviations of the Price Level From Trend
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Source: Data taken from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
vi. Concluding Remarks of the Spanish Labor Market Analysis
By looking at these different measures, I have found different effects that are
able to give important insights into the causes of Spain’s economic problems since the
implementation of the euro in 2001. The extremely high unemployment rate that the
country has been struggling with, especially after the financial crisis of 2008, can in
some degree be explained by their employment protection legislation. Due to the high
cost of firing Spanish workers and the large amount of temporary contracts,
employers are reluctant to hire new people. Hence, this employment protection
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legislation has the effect of permanently increasing the unemployment rate. Other
factors that were discussed that also have affected the country’s high unemployment
rate are the severe consequences that the burst of the housing bubble in Spain had for
the economy combined with the drop in tourism due to the international financial
crisis.
The labor wedge demonstrates the wedge that taxes and the degree of
regulation in the labor market generate between the marginal rate of substitution of
consumption and leisure and the marginal product of labor. My calculations showed
that the labor wedge was the lowest for Spain, and hence I can conclude that this is
not the right measure to look at in order to explain the country’s economic difficulties.
However, by looking at a measure that the European Central Bank can directly
control, such as the price level, I was able to find some indication of the effect of ECB
policy on its member countries. The comparison of the counterfactual (what would
have happened if the trend from the 20 previous years continued) and what actually
happened to the price level in the different countries showed that all of these four
Eurozone countries have been below the counterfactual. However, one can clearly see
that Spain’s price level has diverged more from the counterfactual than any of the
other nations have.
These results give credence to the idea that the issues that Spain has
encountered are a result of the mixture of both country-specific issues, such as the
strong employment protection legislation and the high portion of temporary contracts,
and the Eurozone monetary policy that was imposed on them after they entered the
currency union.
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Conclusions
The implementation of a common currency in 2002 is the best example of
economic integration between European countries. The early years of the currency
union were marked by economic progress of each of the member nations. However,
this apparent success in the first years of the currency union where it looked like the
member countries’ economies were converging was not true. The countries were
actually diverging. The financial crisis in 2008 affected certain countries in the
Eurozone more than others. In the years following this downturn in the economy, one
can see how some of the Eurozone countries have been struggling a lot economically.
In this thesis, I have looked at Spain because I wanted to find the reasons for
the deeper recession that this country has experienced compared to other big countries
in the Eurozone. Also, by comparing Spain to other countries, I wanted to figure out
whether the economic issues experienced in the Eurozone are due to the common
monetary policy or more due to country-specific problems. What is evident from my
research is that there are combinations of factors that have created complications for
Spain.
One significant issue in Spain is their unemployment rate. Spain is one of the
countries with the highest and fastest growing unemployment rates in the Eurozone.
This is an alarming trend. Currently Spain has an unemployment rate of over 26% and
for Spaniards less than 25 years old it is above 50%. Looking at data of
unemployment rates between the different Eurozone countries, it is clear that Spain
has diverged from the other countries since 2008. From the data that I have looked at,
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it is apparent that Spain has experienced difficulties since the recovery phase after the
economic crisis in 2008. Since then, one can clearly see that both the unemployment
rate and the growth rate in real GDP for Spain has diverged from those of Germany,
France, and United Kingdom. Also, compared to these countries, the trend in Spain’s
debt to GDP ratio has been increasing a lot more over the past few years.
The issue that I have researched is whether these problems that Spain have
encountered are due to their membership in the currency union and therefore
suboptimal monetary policy or if it is more due to issues and policies that is
happening domestically. To explore this further I looked at the Spanish labor market.
Some of the measures that I looked at gave credibility to the idea that this is a
Eurozone problem rather than each individual country. This idea was found in the
calculations displayed of the labor wedge. The labor wedge calculation showed that it
was not so much the structural problems in Spain that were the main issue because it
was higher for Germany and France, and lower for Spain and United Kingdom. I also
looked at the ratio of the strictness of regulations on permanent employment relative
to the same measurement for temporary employment and this supported the same
idea. In order for this measurement to have provided us with some indication of that
this might be more of a structural problem in Spain, the values should have been
higher for Germany than for Spain and France. However, the values were similar and
this provides more credibility to the idea that it is the common monetary policy that is
the issue for the member nations of the currency union.
However, some of the other measurements that I looked at showed results that
are supporting the idea of country-specific problems in individual countries in the
Eurozone. Spain has strict employment protection legislation. In the framework that I
discussed, it was shown that higher employment protection leads to a permanently
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higher unemployment rate. Also, I looked at the share of temporary employment and
the unemployment rate. Here I found a strong relationship between these two
measurements. This is especially a problem in Spain because large shares of the
Spanish workers are hired on temporary contracts. I also looked at the deviations from
trend of the inflation rates of the Eurozone countries over the period 2002-2012. The
result found was that Spain had deviated from trend a lot more than the other
countries. This indicates that Spain has had a tighter monetary policy than other
member countries in the currency union and supports the idea of domestic problems
in Spain.
Therefore, as Spain and the Eurozone implements methods to resolve some of
the problems that they are currently facing, it is important to consider this issue as
being a mix of two complications. First, it was a bold move to impose a single
currency on a very heterogeneous group of countries. It is evident that a good
monetary policy for a country such as for example Germany might not be the best
option for a country like Spain. Hence, the common monetary policy for all the
members of the currency union is one of the problems. Second, there are indicators of
country-specific issues that also have developed into problems for some of the
countries in the Eurozone. For Spain this is their employment protection policy,
which has resulted in their extremely high unemployment rate.
The main issues that should be addressed in Spain are their employment
protection legislation and how they can make this policy more flexible. Another issue
to be looked into in Spain is how they are implementing their monetary policy, since
there is found evidence that they have had a tighter monetary policy. Also, one should
try to pay more attention to the development of the Eurozone’s monetary policy so
that all member countries will benefit as much as possible from new changes. If more
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changes like these can be made, Spain can possibly recover from their recession and
the Eurozone will become a stronger currency union.
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